The Admission and Exclusion of Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence in Canada by Gorman, Wayne K.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Court Review: The Journal of the American 
Judges Association American Judges Association 
2018 
The Admission and Exclusion of Unconstitutionally Obtained 
Evidence in Canada 
Wayne K. Gorman 
the Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview 
Gorman, Wayne K., "The Admission and Exclusion of Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence in Canada" 
(2018). Court Review: The Journal of the American Judges Association. 662. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/662 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Judges Association at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Court Review: The Journal of 
the American Judges Association by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - 
Lincoln. 
Footnotes
1. Note, however, that evidence can in limited circumstances also be
excluded in Canada under section 24(1) of the Charter, which
allows a court to issue a “remedy” that the court “considers just
and appropriate.”  In R. v. Bjelland, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 651, at para-
graph 19, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that while the
“exclusion of evidence will normally be a remedy under s. 24(2),
it cannot be ruled out as a remedy under s. 24(1). However, such
a remedy will only be available in those cases where a less intru-
sive remedy cannot be fashioned to safeguard the fairness of the
trial process and the integrity of the justice system.” 
2. In R. v. Mack, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court of Canada
considered the words “obtained in a manner” in section 24(2) and
held that a “causal relationship is not required to support a find-
ing that evidence was obtained in a manner that violated the
Charter, but the nature and extent of the causal relationship
remains an important factor for the trial judge’s consideration” (at
paragraph 42). 
3. For a comparison of the approaches taken by the Supreme Courts
of Canada and the Supreme Court of the United States to the
exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional infringe-
ment, see Donald Stuart, Canadian and United States Supreme
Courts: Rowing in Opposite Directions on Exclusion of Unconstitu-
tionally Obtained Evidence (2009), 70 C.R. (6th) 62. Interestingly,
in Director of Public Prosecutions v. J.C. [2015] IESC 31, the
Supreme Court of Ireland suggested that the United States,
“which at one stage had the most far-reaching exclusionary rule,
has long since abandoned an absolute or near absolute exclusion-
ary rule” (at paragraph 74).  
4. In an earlier case (R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613), the Supreme
Court had ruled that blood-alcohol analysis evidence was inad-
missible pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter as a result of the
accused’s right to contact counsel having been infringed. How-
ever, in excluding the evidence, the Supreme Court indicated that
In Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018), JusticeThomas suggested in a concurring opinion that the“assumption that state courts must apply the federal exclu-
sionary rule is legally dubious.”  In Canada, evidence obtained
in violation of our Constitution can only be excluded if a court
concludes that its admission “would bring the administration
of justice into disrepute.”  This applies in every criminal case
in Canada.  This test is mandated by section 24(2) of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982,
which states:
Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all the circumstances,
the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.1
In this column, I intend to trace the evolution of the
Supreme Court of Canada’s consideration of this provision and
the admission and exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence in Canada.2 As will be seen, it involves the Supreme
Court of Canada issuing a reversal of a long series of judg-
ments it had proffered in this area.  But, let us start before the
Charter was enacted.3
PRE-CHARTER
Prior to the inclusion of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms as part of the Constitution of Canada on April 17th,
1982, the exclusion of evidence in criminal matters was gov-
erned in this country by the common law. The common law
was not favourable to such exclusion. With limited exceptions
(such as the confessions rule) evidence was admissible if it was
relevant.  The manner in which it was obtained being generally
irrelevant. Thus, in R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that there “is no judicial discretion per-
mitting the exclusion of relevant evidence, on the ground of
unfairness to the accused. Judicial discretion in this field is a
concept which involves great uncertainty of application. The
task of a judge in the conduct of a trial is to apply the law and
to admit all evidence that is logically probative unless it is
ruled out by some exclusionary rule. If this course is followed,
an accused person has had a fair trial” (at pages 273 to 274).
All of this changed with the inclusion of the Charter in
Canada’s constitution.
POST-CHARTER
The Supreme Court of Canada’s first fulsome consideration
of section 24(2) of the Charter commenced with Ms. Ruby
Collins being grabbed by the neck by a police officer. After
the officer did so, he noticed that Ms. Collins had something
in her hand.  It turned out to be heroin. It was argued that the
actions of the police officer violated Ms. Collins’s right pur-
suant to section 8 of the Charter to be free from “unreasonable
search or seizure.”  In the Supreme Court of Canada, the pri-
mary issue became whether the heroin was admissible at Ms.
Collins’s trial.4
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“it would be most improvident for this Court to expatiate, in
these early days of life with the Charter upon the meaning of the
expression ‘administration of justice’ and particularly its outer
limits. There will no doubt be, over the years to come, a gradual
build-up in delineation and definition of the words used in the
Charter in s. 24(2)” (at paragraph 12).
5. At page 100.  Several Canadian Courts of Appeal have also con-
cluded that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Grant has
cast doubt upon the continued validity of its pre-Grant jurispru-
dence as regards the application of section 24(2) of the Charter.
In R. v. Blake, [2010] 251 C.C.C. (3d) 3 (Ont. C.A.), for instance,
the Ontario Court of Appeal stated, at paragraph 21, that the
Supreme Court of Canada in Grant “took a judicial wire brush to
the 20 years of jurisprudential gloss that had built up around s.
24(2) and scrubbed down to the bare words of the section.” Sim-
ilarly, in R. v. Ngai, [2010] A.J. No. 96 (C.A.), it was held that
Grant has “refocused the section 24(2) analysis and directed
courts to balance the effect of admitting the evidence on society’s
confidence in the judicial system” (at paragraph 33). In R. v.
Wong, [2010] B.C.J. No. 557, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal suggested that the “distinction between conscriptive and
non-conscriptive evidence set out in Stillman is no longer as sig-
nificant in analyzing admissibility. Reliability, which is often a
hallmark of real evidence will always be a cogent consideration
but will not be dispositive...” (at paragraph 15).
6. Professor Donald Stuart in Welcome Flexibility and Better Criteria
for Section 24(2), (2009), 66 C.R. (6th) 82, suggests that much “of
the voluminous prior jurisprudence on section 24(2) will be of
little moment” as a result of Grant (at page 82). 
In R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, the Supreme Court of
Canada commenced its analysis of this issue by noting that the
accused has the burden, on the standard of the balance of prob-
abilities, to establish that admission of the evidence would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute (see para-
graph 30).
The Supreme Court set out a list of factors in Collins, which
should be considered when applying section 24(2) of the
Charter, and held that a trial judge must  have “regard to all the
circumstances” in determining whether evidence obtained in
violation of the Charter should be admitted or excluded (at
paragraph 43). It concluded that the evidence seized should
have been excluded because it could not “accept that police
officers take flying tackles at people and seize them by the
throat when they do not have reasonable and probable grounds
to believe that those people are either dangerous or handlers of
drugs” (at paragraph 45).
Subsequently, in R. v. Fliss, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535, the factors
to be considered were summarized by the Supreme Court in
the following manner (at paragraph 75):
1. Does the admission of the evidence affect the fair-
ness of the trial?
2. How serious was the Charter breach?
3. What would be the effect of excluding the evidence
on the repute of the administration of justice?
CONSCRIPTIVE VERSUS NON-CONSCRIPTIVE
In R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, the Supreme Court
created a distinction for exclusion purposes based upon
whether the evidence unconstitutionally obtained was con-
scriptive or non-conscriptive.  The Court held in Stillman that
“admission of evidence which falls into the non-conscriptive
category will, as stated in Collins, rarely operate to render the
trial unfair” (at paragraph 74). If the accused, however, was
“compelled to participate in the creation or discovery of the
evidence” then it will be considered to be “conscriptive evi-
dence,” even if it is “real evidence” (at paragraph 75) and its
admission will generally render the trial unfair.  A few years
later in R. v. Law, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227, the Supreme Court con-
firmed this approach by suggesting that “it will be much easier
to exclude evidence if its admis-
sion would affect the fairness of
the trial as opposed to condon-
ing a serious constitutional vio-
lation” (at paragraph 33).
Thus, the Supreme Court
started out with a general and
vague test (a consideration of all of the circumstances).  It then
developed a test in which the nature of the evidence (con-
scriptive or non-conscriptive) became the crucial factor in
determining admissibility. In The Grant Trilogy and the Right
Against Self-incrimination (2009), 66 C.R. (6th) 97, Professor
Hamish Stewart summarized the effect of these decisions in the
following manner (at page 100):
Evidence obtained in violation of the Charter is to be
excluded under s. 24(2) where its admission would
“bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”
Under the Collins/Stillman approach, trial judges were to
consider whether admission of evidence in the proceed-
ings would make the trial unfair, whether the Charter
violations were serious, and whether exclusion of evi-
dence would have an adverse effect on the repute of the
justice system. And, according to the controversial
majority ruling in Stillman, exclusion under the first
branch was virtually automatic if the evidence obtained
was “conscriptive” (that is, self-incriminatory) or was
derived from conscriptive evidence and was undiscover-
able by constitutional methods. 
All of this changed with the issuance of the Supreme Court’s
decision in In R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353.  The conscrip-
tive versus non-conscriptive dichotomy was abandoned. Pro-
fessor Stewart describes it as having been “swept away.”5
R. v. GRANT
In Grant, the Court indicated that the “existing jurispru-
dence” on exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
Charter was “difficult to apply and may lead to unsatisfactory
results... we find it our duty, given the difficulties that have
been pointed out to us, to take a fresh look at the frameworks
that have been developed” (at paragraph 3).6
The Supreme Court commenced its fresh look by indicating
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“All of this
changed with the
issuance of . . . 
R. v. Grant.”
7. In R. v. Stanton, [2010] B.C.J. No. 753, the British Columbia Court
of Appeal indicated, at paragraph 52, that the “revised framework
under Grant for the admissibility of evidence under s. 24(2) of the
Charter recognizes that trial judges continue to have a broad dis-
cretion in determining whether evidence obtained in breach of a
Charter right will nevertheless be admitted, but the exercise of
that discretion is to be informed and guided by the words of s.
24(2).”
8. Similarly in Marwood v. Commissioner of Police, [2016] NZSC 139,
the Supreme Court of New Zealand noted that when exclusion of
evidence is sought in New Zealand, the “proper assessment to be
made [is] whether the breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
necessitated exclusion of evidence.” The Supreme Court indi-
cated that the answer to this question “turns, principally, on
assessment of the seriousness of the breach of the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act and the extent to which it is proper for the court
to be co-opted into countenancing it.  It cannot be sufficient
answer that the ends justify the admission (as is suggested) with-
out further consideration of the nature of the breach” (at para-
graph 64).
9. In R. v. Morelli, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at paragraph 102, the
Supreme Court indicated that the “repute of the administration of
justice is jeopardized by judicial indifference to unacceptable
police conduct.”
that though the test set out in sec-
tion 24(2) of the Charter is a
“broad and imprecise” one (at
paragraph 60), the “words of s.
24(2) capture its purpose: to
maintain the good repute of the
administration of justice” (at
paragraph 67).7 Thus, the “focus
is not only long-term, but prospective. The fact of the Charter
breach means damage has already been done to the administra-
tion of justice” (at paragraph 69). The Supreme Court also indi-
cated that section 24(2) starts “from that proposition and seeks
to ensure that evidence obtained through that breach does not
do further damage to the repute of the justice system.... Finally,
s. 24(2)’s focus is societal. Section 24(2) is not aimed at punish-
ing the police or providing compensation to the accused, but
rather at systemic concerns. The s. 24(2) focus is on the broad
impact of admission of the evidence on the long-term repute of
the justice system” (at paragraphs 69–70).8
THE NEW GRANT TEST
The Supreme Court concluded in Grant that there are “three
avenues of inquiry” to which consideration must be given
when applying section 24(2) of the Charter. At paragraph 71,
these three avenues were described as follows:
(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state con-
duct (admission may send the message the justice
system condones serious state misconduct);9
(2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected
interests of the accused (admission may send the
message that individual rights count for little); and
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on
its merits.
It is interesting that the Supreme Court of Canada not only
set out these criteria, but that for the first two they included a
comment in brackets. It may be that the Court has added its
own explanatory notes. If so, then it appears that the Court is
encouraging trial judges to consider (1) that admitting evi-
dence obtained by the police as a result of a serious violation
of the Charter will suggest to the public that the Court con-
dones such conduct and (2) that admitting such evidence
when the violation has had a significant impact upon the right
being protected will suggest that the protected right is of little
consequence.
Though the first two avenues may appear interconnected
they involve two separate and distinct avenues of analysis. In
the first avenue the Court must take an objective approach
(i.e., how serious was the Charter violation?), while in the sec-
ond avenue a subjective approach must be adopted (i.e., what
effect did the breach of the Charter have on the specific rights
of the accused protected by the section in issue?).  
In R. v. Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, the Supreme Court of
Canada considered its decision in Grant and indicated that evi-
dence obtained unconstitutionally “should be excluded under
section 24(2) if considering all of the circumstances, its admis-
sion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
This determination requires a balancing assessment involving
three broad inquiries: (1) the seriousness of the Charter-infring-
ing state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused; and (3) society’s interest in
the adjudication of the case on its merits” (at paragraph 81).
The Supreme Court of Canada also indicated in Grant that
a trial judge’s role when considering a section 24(2) applica-
tion involves balancing “the assessments under each of these
lines of inquiry to determine whether, considering all the cir-
cumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the admin-
istration of justice into disrepute” (at paragraph 71). This
might be described as the fourth and final stage of inquiry. 
Having described the three-avenue approach created by
Grant, let us start with the avenue involving the seriousness of
the alleged Charter breach.
(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state con-
duct (admission may send the message the justice system
condones serious state misconduct)
In Grant, the Supreme Court held, at paragraph 73, that this
avenue requires a trial judge to evaluate “the seriousness of the
state conduct that led to the breach.” The more severe or delib-
erate the conduct involved “the greater the need for the courts
to dissociate themselves from that conduct, by excluding evi-
dence linked to that conduct” (at paragraph 72).  
In R. v. Tsekouras, 2017 ONCA 290, the Ontario Court of
Appeal considered Grant and indicated that to “determine the
seriousness of the infringement under this line of inquiry, a
court must look to the interests engaged by the right infringed
and examine the extent to which the violation actually
impacted on those interests….An unreasonable search that
intrudes upon an area in which an individual reasonably enjoys
a high expectation of privacy or that demeans a person’s dignity
is more seriousness than one that does not” (at paragraph 111). 
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Court concluded 
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‘three avenues 
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In R. v. Kiene, [2015] A.J. No. 1159 (C.A.), the Alberta
Court of Appeal summarized the test enunciated in Grant as
regards section 24(2) of the Charter by indicating that “the
goal is to preserve public confidence in the rule of law and its
processes” (at paragraph 34):
The Grant test for exclusion of evidence asks whether
a reasonable person, informed of all relevant circum-
stances and the values underlying the Charter, would
conclude that the admission of the evidence would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute: para
68. Exclusion of the evidence is not a punishment of
those involved; the goal is to preserve public confidence
in the rule of law and its processes: para 73. The court
must balance the seriousness of the Charter-infringing
conduct, the impact of the breach upon the appellant,
and society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on
the merits.
(2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected
interests of the accused (admission may send the message
that individual rights count for little)
In relation to this avenue, the Supreme Court indicated in
Grant, at paragraph 76, that trial judges must concentrate on
“the seriousness of the impact of the Charter breach on the
Charter-protected interests of the accused.” This requires an
evaluation “of the extent to which the breach actually under-
mined the interests protected by the right infringed” and the
“degree to which the violation impacted on those interests.” 
In R. v. Côté, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 215, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the second line of inquiry and held that it “deals with
the seriousness of the impact of the Charter violation on the
Charter-protected interests of the accused.  The impact may
range from that resulting from a minor technical breach to that
following a profoundly intrusive violation. The more serious
the impact on the accused’s constitutional rights, the more the
admission of the evidence is likely to bring the administration
of justice into disrepute” (at paragraph 47).  
More recently in R. v. Paterson, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 202, the
Supreme Court noted that the “second inquiry under the s.
24(2) analysis focusses on whether the admission of the evi-
dence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute
from the standpoint of society’s interest in respect for Charter
rights. This entails considering the degree to which a Charter
infringement undermined the Charter-protected interest” (at
paragraph 42). 
In R. v. Morelli, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, the Supreme Court of
Canada had held, at paragraph 104, that the “intrusiveness of
the search is of particular importance” in applying the second
avenue of analysis when a breach of section 8 of the Charter
has occurred (the right to be free from unreasonable searches
10. Similarly, in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the
Supreme Court of the United States noted, at paragraph 4, that
the “exclusionary rule” can generate “substantial social costs” and
constitute a “‘costly toll’ upon truth seeking and law enforcement
objectives.” The same point was made by the Supreme Court of
Ireland in Director of Public Prosecutions v. J.C. [2015] IESC 31, in
which it indicated that “many courts have recognised, where
cogent and compelling evidence of guilt is found but not admit-
ted on the basis of trivial technical breach, the administration of
justice far from being served, may be brought into disrepute” (at
paragraph 97).
or seizures). In Morelli, the
unlawful search involved the
accused person’s home and per-
sonal computer. The Court
stated, at paragraph 105, that “it
is difficult to imagine a more
intrusive invasion of privacy
than the search of one’s home and personal computer.” In con-
trast, in R. v. Harrison, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494, at paragraph 30,
the Court indicated that “motorists have a lower expectation of
privacy in their vehicles than they do in their homes. As par-
ticipants in a highly regulated activity, they know that they
may be stopped for reasons pertaining to highway safety .... In
these respects, the intrusion on liberty and privacy represented
by the detention is less severe than it would be in the case of a
pedestrian. Further, nothing in the encounter was demeaning
to the dignity of the appellant.”
In R. v. Stanton (2010), 254 C.C.C. (3d) 421, the second
avenue of inquiry was summarized by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal in the following manner (at paragraph 54):
The impact of a Charter breach may range from fleet-
ing and technical to the profoundly intrusive. The more
serious the impact on an accused’s protected interests,
the greater the risk that admission of the evidence may
signal to the public that Charter rights are of little actual
avail to the citizen (para. 76). An unreasonable search
contrary to s. 8 may impact on the protected interests of
privacy, and more broadly, human dignity. An unreason-
able search that intrudes on an area in which the indi-
vidual enjoys a high expectation of privacy, or that
demeans his or her dignity, is more serious than one that
does not (para. 78).
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on
its merits
In relation to this criterion, the Supreme Court suggested in
Grant, at paragraph 79, that Canadian society “generally
expects that a criminal allegation will be adjudicated on its
merits.” Thus, the third avenue of inquiry requires a trial judge
to ask him- or herself “whether the truth-seeking function of
the criminal trial process would be better served by admission
of the evidence, or by its exclusion?” The Court held that the
reliability of the evidence “is an important factor in this line of
inquiry” because the exclusion of reliable evidence can render
a trial “unfair from the public perspective, thus bringing the
administration of justice into disrepute” (at paragraph 81).
Ultimately, trial judges must face the question as to “whether
the vindication of the specific Charter violation through the
exclusion of evidence extracts too great a toll on the truth-
seeking goal of the criminal trial” (at paragraph 82).10
“An unreasonable
search . . . may
impact . . . on
human dignity.”
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11. In Wong, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, at paragraph 18,
indicated that though the seriousness of the crime, “while still a
relevant consideration, is perhaps of a lesser weight in the analyt-
ical exercise now to be performed under s. 24(2).” It has been
held that in some cases the seriousness of the offence will be a
“neutral” factor (see R. v. Martin (2010), 361 N.B.R. (2d) 251
(C.A.), at paragraph 96).
tial to cut both ways.” The Supreme Court indicated, at para-
graph 84, that “while the public has a heightened interest in
seeing a determination on the merits where the offence
charged is serious, it also has a vital interest in having a justice
system that is above reproach, particularly where the penal
stakes for the accused are high.”11
More recently, in R. v. Marakah, 2017 S.C.C. 59, after con-
cluding that the police had seized text messages in contraven-
tion of the Charter, the Supreme Court concluded that the evi-
dence should be excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the
Charter. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
referred to is decision in Grant and indicated that “while the
public has a heightened interest in seeing a determination on
the merits where the offence charged is serious” it is “impor-
tant not to allow... society’s interest in adjudicating a case on its
merits to trump all other considerations” (at paragraph 72).
BODILY EVIDENCE (BLOOD, DNA, ETC.)
The Court held in Grant that “the approach to admissibility
of bodily evidence under s. 24(2) that asks simply whether the
evidence was conscripted should be replaced by a flexible test
based on all the circumstances, as the wording of s. 24(2)
requires. As for other types of evidence, admissibility should
be determined by inquiring into the effect admission may have
on the repute of the justice system, having regard to the seri-
ousness of the police conduct, the impact of the Charter breach
on the protected interests of the accused, and the value of a
trial on the merits” (at paragraph 107).
DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE
In relation to derivative evidence (defined in Grant as phys-
ical evidence obtained, for instance, as a result of an unconsti-
tutionally obtained statement), the Court held that to “deter-
mine whether the admission of derivative evidence would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s.
24(2), courts must pursue the usual three lines of inquiry out-
lined in these reasons, taking into account the self-incrimina-
tory origin of the evidence in an improperly obtained state-
ment as well as its status as real evidence” (at paragraph 123).
However, the Court also held that discoverability “retains a
useful role, however, in assessing the actual impact of the
breach on the protected interests of the accused. It allows the
court to assess the strength of the causal connection between
the Charter-infringing self-incrimination and the resultant evi-
dence. The more likely it is that the evidence would have been
obtained even without the statement, the lesser the impact of
the breach on the accused’s underlying interest against self-
incrimination” (at paragraph 122).  Finally, on this point the
Court held that a judge “should refuse to admit evidence
where there is reason to believe the police deliberately abused
their power to obtain a statement which might lead them to
such evidence. Where derivative evidence is obtained by way
of a deliberate or flagrant Charter breach, its admission would
A number of years later, in
Cole, at paragraph 95, the
Supreme Court held that “the
considerations under this third
inquiry must not be permitted to
overwhelm the s. 24(2) analy-
sis….They are nonetheless enti-
tled to appropriate weight and, in
the circumstances of this case,
they clearly weigh against exclusion of the evidence.”  In Côté,
the Court held that the “reliability of the evidence and its
importance to the prosecution’s case are key factors” (at para-
graph 47). The Supreme Court of Canada also indicated in
Côté that “excluding highly reliable evidence may more nega-
tively affect the truth-seeking function of the criminal law
process where the effect is to ‘gut’ the prosecution’s case” (at
paragraph 47).  
More recently in Paterson, the Supreme Court indicated, at
paragraph 51, that the third avenue of inquiry “entails consid-
ering the reliability of the evidence and its importance to the
Crown’s case.” The Court also indicated in Paterson that it is
“important not to allow the third Grant factor of society’s inter-
est in adjudicating a case on its merits to trump all other con-
siderations, particularly where (as here) the impugned con-
duct was serious and worked a substantial impact on the
appellant’s Charter right” (at paragraph 56).
In Stanton, at paragraph 56, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal indicated that “the importance of the evidence to the
prosecution’s case is another factor that may be considered ...
the exclusion of highly reliable evidence may impact more neg-
atively on the repute of the administration of justice where the
remedy effectively guts the prosecution.” 
In R. v. Beaulieu, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 248, the trial judge, in a
pre-Grant decision, had found a violation of section 8 of the
Charter, but ruled that the evidence in issue (a gun) was
admissible.  In upholding this conclusion, the Supreme Court
touched on the three factors referred to in Grant by stating (at
paragraph 8):
As noted above, the trial judge’s conclusions as to the
seriousness of the breach were central to this case, and
they remain equally relevant under the Grant approach.
As for the impact of the breach, the trial judge took into
account Mr. Beaulieu’s reduced privacy interest in his car
and the limited scope and invasiveness of the search.
With regard to society’s interest in adjudication on the
merits, she concluded that the evidence was crucial to
the Crown’s case. It is also uncontested that a gun is reli-
able evidence.
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENCE
The seriousness of the offence committed is a factor for con-
sideration though it was held in Grant that it “has the poten-
“The seriousness
of the offence 
. . . has the 
potential to cut
both ways.”
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bring the administration of justice into further disrepute and
the evidence should be excluded” (at paragraph 128).
In in Utah v. Strieff, No. 14–1373 (2016), the Supreme
Court of the United States also considered the admissibility of
derivative evidence (found after an unlawful motor vehicle
stop). It concluded that the evidence was admissible because
“the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the preexist-
ing arrest warrant” (at page 8): 
Applying these factors, we hold that the evidence dis-
covered on Strieff’s person was admissible because the
unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the preex-
isting arrest warrant. Although the illegal stop was close
in time to Strieff’s arrest, that consideration is out-
weighed by two factors supporting the State. The out-
standing arrest warrant for Strieff’s arrest is a critical
intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of
the illegal stop. The discovery of that warrant broke the
causal chain between the unconstitutional stop and the
discovery of evidence by compelling Officer Fackrell to
arrest Strieff. And, it is especially significant that there is
no evidence that Officer Fackrell’s illegal stop reflected
flagrantly unlawful police misconduct.12
THE FINAL STEP: THE BALANCING
In Grant, the Supreme Court directed trial judges to assess
section 24(2) applications by making the inquiries referred to
under the three avenues (described by the Court as a “decision
tree”) and then “determine whether, on balance, the admission
of the evidence obtained by Charter breach would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute” (at paragraph 85).
Similarly, in R. v. Nolet, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851, at paragraph 54,
the Supreme Court indicated that the “task for courts remains
one of achieving a balance between individual and societal
interests with a view to determining whether the administra-
tion of justice would be brought into disrepute by admission of
the evidence.” 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada has created
a broad societal test in its analysis of section 24(2) of the Char-
ter, which requires a consideration of the long term.  Thus, in
R. v. Taylor, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 495, the Supreme Court indicated,
at paragraph 37, that when “faced with an application for
exclusion under s. 24(2), a court must assess and balance the
effect of admitting the evidence on the public’s confidence in
the justice system, having regard to ‘the seriousness of the
Charter-infringing state conduct, the impact of the breach on
the Charter-protected interests of the accused, and the societal
interest in an adjudication on the merits.’”
In Morelli, the Supreme Court said, at paragraph 108, that
in balancing the considerations set out in Grant, trial judges
are required “to bear in mind the long-term and prospective
repute of the administration of justice, focussing less on the
particular case than on the
impact over time of admitting the
evidence obtained by infringe-
ment of the constitutionally pro-
tected rights of the accused.” At
paragraph 86 of Grant, the final
step in the required analysis was
succinctly summarized by the
Supreme Court of Canada in the following manner:
In all cases, it is the task of the trial judge to weigh
the various indications. No overarching rule governs
how the balance is to be struck. Mathematical precision
is obviously not possible. However, the preceding analy-
sis creates a decision tree, albeit more flexible than the
Stillman self-incrimination test. We believe this to be
required by the words of s. 24(2).
In R. v. Fan, 2017 B.C.C.A. 99, it was indicated that a sec-
tion 24(2) analysis requires that the evidence “on each line of
inquiry is weighed and all the circumstances are considered in
determining whether admission of the impugned evidence
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. No
one consideration is permitted consistently to trump or over-
whelm the others. In all cases, the court must assess the effect
of admission or exclusion on the long-term repute of the jus-
tice system and ensure that it is not damaged any further by the
breach” (at paragraph 68).
In R. v. Tsekouras (2017), 353 C.C.C. (3d) 349 (Ont. C.A.),
it was noted that these “lines of inquiry under Grant involve
fact-finding and the assignment of weight to various interests
often at odds with each other. There is no overarching prin-
ciple that mandates how this balance is to be achieved” (at
paragraph 106).
THE RESULT IN GRANT
In Grant, the Supreme Court concluded that the accused had
been arbitrarily detained in violation of section 9 of the Charter
because the police did not have lawful grounds to detain the
accused.  In addition, the Court also concluded that the police
violated section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to advise the
accused that he had the right to “contact counsel without
delay.” As a result, it was necessary for the Court to determine
whether the evidence obtained (a gun obtained as a result of a
statement made by the accused to the police in contravention of
the Charter) should be excluded or admitted.  The Supreme
Court concluded that the gun should be admitted.
The Supreme Court held that “the police conduct was not
egregious. The impact of the Charter breach on the accused’s
protected interests was significant, although not at the most seri-
ous end of the scale. Finally, the value of the evidence is consid-
erable.... Unlike the situation in R. v. Harrison, [2009] 2 S.C.R.
12. The latter words would be very familiar to Canadian judges and
lawyers. In R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, for instance, the
Supreme Court, in holding that evidence obtained in that case in
violation of the Charter was admissible, noted that there was not
“even a whiff of the sort of indifference on the part of the police
to the suspect’s rights that requires a court to disassociate itself
from that conduct” (at paragraph 95).  In R. v. Culotta, 2018
ONCA 665, the Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that “[g]ood
faith honest errors by the police represent less serious Charter
infringements” (at paragraph 67).
“’No overarching
rule governs
how the balance
is to be struck.’
Grant.”
13. In Harrison, among the factors that led the Supreme Court of
Canada to conclude that the evidence obtained after a violation of
the Charter should have been excluded was its finding that the
“police conduct in stopping and searching the appellant’s vehicle
without any semblance of reasonable grounds was reprehensible,
and was aggravated by the officer’s misleading testimony in court”
(at paragraph 35). 
14. In Trends for Exclusion of Evidence in 2012, (2013) 1 C.R. (7th) 74,
Ariane Asselin conducted an empirical survey of decisions ren-
dered in 2012, which applied section 24(2) of the Charter. She
concluded as follows (at page 74):
This survey shows that there continues to be a high rate of
exclusion by trial judges for unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence comparable to earlier surveys conducted in the wake of
Grant. Particularly noteworthy are the rates of exclusion for
specific types of evidence. The survey identifies a high level of
exclusion for bodily evidence, including breath samples, and a
lower rate of exclusion for testimonial evidence. Moreover,
with respect to non-bodily physical evidence, the survey
shows that the rate of exclusion for drugs is 20% higher than
for guns. These results are surprising given the Supreme Court
of Canada’s (SCC) comments in Grant about how exclusion
could operate in relation to different types of evidence and its
anticipation that certain patterns would emerge. The findings
of this survey signal that the emerging patterns at the trial
court level are perhaps not the ones intended by the SCC.
494, the police officers here were
operating in circumstances of
considerable legal uncertainty. In
our view, this tips the balance in
favour of admission, suggesting
that the repute of the justice sys-
tem would not suffer from allow-
ing the gun to be admitted in evi-
dence against the appellant” (at
paragraph 140).13
SYSTEMIC BREACHES OF THE CHARTER
The Supreme Court of Canada most recent consideration of
section 24(2) of the Charter came in R. v. G.T.D., 2018 S.C.C.
7. At issue in this case was whether evidence should be
excluded based upon the Edmonton Police Service’s use of a
standard caution form of warning to arrested individuals,
which had the effect of violating their right to contact counsel
pursuant to section 10(b) of the Charter.
The majority’s decision has been interpreted as indicating
that in assessing the seriousness of a breach of the Charter a
court’s analysis should not be limited to a consideration of the
arresting officer’s behavior individually, but should also
include a pattern of institutional errors, which may have led to
the breach (see R. v. Ippak, 2018 NUCA 3, at paragraphs 43 and
97).  However, this appears somewhat overstated.  The major-
ity decision by the Supreme Court on this point consists
entirely of the following brief comments (at paragraph 3):
The next issue is whether this breach warrants the
exclusion of G.T.D.’s statement under s. 24(2) of the
Charter. A majority of the Court is of the view that it
does, and relies substantially on the reasons of Justice
Veldhuis at the Court of Appeal. As she noted at para. 83
of her reasons, the Crown had ample opportunity to call
further evidence about Edmonton Police Service train-
ing or policy, but chose not to do so. The majority would
therefore allow the appeal and order a new trial.
CONCLUSION
In Grant the Supreme Court dramatically changed the
approach it initially created in relation to whether unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence should be excluded or admitted.
Subsequently, its formulation in Grant has been the subject of
significant consideration and commentary. Thus the question:
Where are we in Canada as regards the admission or exclusion
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence?  I would proffer the
following as a summary of the principles set out in Grant and
its subsequent consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada:
1. Grant should be seen as a dramatic reformulation
of the test applicable to section 24(2) Charter
analysis.14
2. In considering and applying section 24(2) of the
Charter a trial judge must apply and utilize the three
avenues set out in Grant:
(i) the first step, “the seriousness of the Charter-
infringing state conduct,” focuses on the
actions of the police.  The first step involves
placing the breach of the Charter along a con-
tinuum of misconduct. The more significant
or deliberate the conduct involved, the more
likely the evidence will be excluded. A fla-
grant disregard for the Charter by the police
will be seen as being very different than a
breach in which the police believe they are
acting in accordance with the law;
(ii) the second step, “the impact of the breach on
the Charter-protected interests of the accused
(admission may send the message that indi-
vidual rights count for little),” involves a con-
sideration of the the impact of the Charter
breach on the Charter-protected interests of
the accused. This requires an evaluation of the
degree to which the Charter violation
impacted on the interests sought to be pro-
tected by the Charter. The intrusiveness of the
breach is of particular importance in this step
of the analysis. Thus, a distinction between
searches involving residences and vehicles has
been made; and
(iii) the third step, “society’s interest in the adjudi-
cation of the case on its merits,” requires a
consideration of the importance of the truth-
seeking function of the trial process. In this
regard, the reliability of the evidence in issue
becomes a crucial factor.
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“[T]he third step 
. . . requires a
consideration of
the truth seeking
function of the
trial process.”
3. Once these three factors have been applied and con-
sidered, the final step involves a balancing of the
effect admission of the unconstitutionally obtained
evidence would have on the repute of the adminis-
tration of justice versus the effect that excluding the
evidence would have on the repute of the adminis-
tration of justice. It appears that the key to the last
step in the analysis is balancing the seriousness of
the violation against the importance and reliability
of the evidence.
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The American Judges Association (AJA) conducted interviews about procedural 
fairness with nine national leaders on issues involving judges and the courts. The 
interviews, done by Kansas Court of Appeals Judge and past AJA president Steve
Leben, cover the elements of procedural fairness for courts and judges, how judges
can improve fairness skills, and how the public reacts to courts and judges. The
interviews were done in August 2014; job titles are shown as of the date of the 
interviews.
Visit http://proceduralfairnessguide.org/interviews/ to watch the interviews.
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION:
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS INTERVIEWS
